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The economies of developed countries have, since 2007, experienced the most 
significant and persistent period of economic malaise since the 1930s. Domestic 
economic policies have failed to revive sustained economic growth and, as a result, 
unemployment remains at levels that voters find difficult to accept. In addition, without 
tax revenue–enhancing growth, government deficits persist, and borrowing to finance 
the cumulative deficits has become increasingly difficult for some countries. With 
domestic policies largely exhausted, but economic growth elusive, policy makers have 
been considering external policies as a means to stimulate their economies. Trade 
protectionism and strategic devaluation are potential policies. The lessons of the 1930s 
regarding the dangers of beggar thy neighbour protectionism appear to retain their 
currency with policy makers, but the same may not be true for strategic devaluation. 
The article outlines the likely poor efficacy of strategic devaluation as a politically 
convenient mechanism to escape the current economic malaise.    
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Introduction 
This can be seen starkly by comparing Britain and Spain. Based on debts, 
deficits and inflation, Britain should be the riskier credit. But British bonds 
yield around 2.3% whereas Spain’s yield around 5.5%. One reason is that 
Britain can still devalue to boost growth; Spain can’t. 
 
The Economist 
November 5, 2011, p. 96 
Meanwhile debtor governments are saying that is it is beyond their 
endurance to wait any longer for a problematic rise in prices; while 
bankers declare that, unless some sort of agreed policy is reached about 
exchanges, we shall soon be launched, with disastrous confusion, on a 
competitive depreciation of currencies. 
 
John Maynard Keynes 
The Daily Mail, June 20, 1933
1 
n the flurry of international, European Union and Eurozone-17 meetings in the fall 
of 2011 meant to deal with the sovereign debt difficulties of a number of European 
countries that use the euro as their currency, and indeed whether the euro would 
survive at all, there was a subtle undertone that a potential solution for hard-pressed 
governments lay in abandoning the euro so that they could engage in competitive 
devaluation of their new currencies. These events had a considerable deja vu feel to 
them. When Keynes was writing in The Daily Mail in the summer of 1933, the major 
international conference in London that was meant to find a coordinated solution to 
the financial stresses of what had yet to be termed the Great Depression had just 
ended in failure. The global economy had suffered three years of economic decline 
and governments were desperate to find a path back to economic growth – in Keynes’ 
terms a rise in prices. A cooperative solution could not be found in London in the 
summer of 1933 and a cooperative solution proved just as elusive in the autumn of 
2011. In the background lurks the non-cooperative solution of strategic devaluations. 
Economic Policy and Recession 
lthough in many ways the global economy of 2011 is very different from the 
global economy of 1933, the problems are strikingly similar. The economic 
downturns both followed the bursting of a financial bubble. In 1930 the economic 
orthodoxy for domestic economic policy suggested that governments simply had to 
wait until markets automatically cleared via price declines. After three years of 
widespread and large scale unemployment, however, this price adjustment process 
I 
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was taking far longer than anticipated and few believed that prosperity was just 
around the corner.
2 The economic orthodoxy of the time was also that governments 
should always balance their budgets and, as tax their revenues fell, they attempted to 
achieve the balanced budget goals by either cutting expenditures or raising new taxes. 
Cutting expenditures or raising taxes, of course, reduces demand, thereby 
exacerbating the shortfall in demand and contributing to the downward economic 
cycle. Under this economic paradigm there are few domestic economic levers to pull. 
Central banks can ensure that there is no liquidity constraint on borrowing, but the 
financial position and prospects are so poor for many businesses that it would be 
imprudent for banks to lend to them even if there is no shortage of funds available to 
lend. Economic growth is what is needed. 
As a result of the failure of economic growth to return in the 1930s, a new 
economic orthodoxy arose. Of course, this was the Keynesian revolution that resulted 
from the attack on the ruling economic paradigm found in Keynes’ 1936 book titled 
The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Keynes correctly 
understood that waiting for automatic market adjustments through price declines was 
likely to be a slow process at best and one that imposed unnecessary hardship in terms 
of unemployment. It was also too slow to be politically acceptable for voters. The 
radical solution put forth was that restoring economic growth would require 
intervention to stimulate demand. Given that neither consumers, either because they 
were unemployed or because they were worried about losing their jobs, nor businesses 
with excess capacity and faced with sluggish or falling sales would increase their 
expenditures to stimulate demand, it fell to governments to intervene to enhance 
demand by increasing their expenditures. This would be accomplished by running 
deficits financed through borrowing until the required economic growth occurred. 
While a great deal has been done since 1936 in the name of Keynes, the major result 
of the Keynesian revolution was that it became generally accepted that governments 
had a countercyclical role to play in the management of the economy. There have, of 
course, been major arguments about the correct mix of expenditure, taxation and 
monetary policies to use to best realize countercyclical objectives, but governments 
are expected to intervene to prevent sustained recessions and unsustainable booms. 
In the wake of the financial bubble bursting in 2007, and the ensuing crisis, 
governments followed the Keynesian orthodoxy of countercyclical activities. They ran 
government deficits, provided stimulus packages, encouraged central banks to keep 
interest rates low and intervened to prop up financial institutions facing liquidity 
constraints. These efforts, while not entirely offsetting the fallout for the real economy 
from the financial crisis, for the most part prevented declines in employment similar William A. Kerr 
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to those experienced in the 1930s. They were not, however, sufficient to totally offset 
employment declines, causing consumers to rein in expenditures due to worries over 
the potential for further job losses. Further, consumers in a number of countries faced 
declines in housing prices, and hence their wealth or debt security, leading to attempts 
reduce personal debt load. Businesses, faced with flat domestic demand, were not 
investing in new capacity. Growth has remained elusive for developed economies. As 
a result, governments have had to continue deficit financing. 
The economic growth that would raise tax revenues and reduce expenditures on 
unemployment benefits and other social welfare transfers has stubbornly refused to 
materialize. While there has been considerable growth in the developing world, 
particularly in Asia and South America, its spillover to developed countries has been 
largely limited to countries such as Germany with specialized and high-quality capital 
equipment to sell and Canada and Australia with sought-after natural resources. For 
most countries, foreign demand did not have a discernible positive impact on growth. 
Competition from developing economies has meant rising energy prices, further 
squeezing the budgets of households and firms in developed countries. 
In a number of European countries, primarily but not exclusively those where 
there was a housing bubble that broke in the wake of the financial crisis, continued 
borrowing to finance government deficits became problematic. As a result, these 
governments have been forced to attempt to rein in their deficits through draconian 
reductions in expenditures and/or radical increases in taxes. In circumstances of 
general economic malaise, these austerity measures have had the same effect as 
attempts to balance budgets in the early 1930s – declines in consumer confidence and 
less purchasing of private sector output by governments and businesses facing higher 
taxes (or reduced opportunities for tax avoidance). It is a classic example of the 
paradox of thrift (Samuelson and Scott, 1966), whereby the rational decisions of 
consumers and businesses to tighten their belts lead to pro-cyclical economic 
outcomes. 
There is a new pro-cyclical element to the austerity measures taken by 
governments in 2010 and 2011 that was not present in the early 1930s. The proportion 
of national economic activity accounted for by government has risen consistently 
since the Great Depression to reach between 40 and 50 percent for most developed 
economies (Kerr, 2009). In the wake of the Keynesian revolution, government 
employees and their salaries have been seen as part of the solution rather than part of 
the problem. One key aspect of countercyclical economic policy is automatic 
stabilizers – institutional arrangements that do not require legislative or proactive 
budgetary activities by governments. The most obvious example of an automatic William A. Kerr 
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stabilizer is government unemployment insurance which automatically begins making 
payments to workers who are made redundant. This puts money in the hands of the 
unemployed, thus reducing the decline in aggregate demand. Progressive income 
taxes operate in a similar fashion when incomes fall. Although not as countercyclical 
as these institutional arrangements, not reducing employment in the government and 
maintaining public sector wages when the private sector is moving into recession act 
to support demand. Austerity measures in countries such as Greece and the United 
Kingdom in 2010 and 2011 have required both reductions in the wages and/or benefits 
of government workers, and reductions in the size of the civil service. These represent 
direct reductions in aggregate demand. In addition, however, worries about job losses 
among members of the civil service have the same psychological effect as they have 
in the case of private-sector workers. In anticipation of the possibility of losing one’s 
job in the future, individuals act to reduce their debt load/build up their savings. Of 
course, these precautionary reductions in expenditures contribute to the decline in 
demand and, hence, are pro-cyclical. Thus, the negative effect on demand of job 
losses and wage declines in the public sector is much larger than the actual reductions 
in government expenditures. This heightened anxiety effect on personal expenditures 
appears not to have been anticipated, for example, by the British government in its 
attempts to balance its budget after the major expenditures made to stabilize its 
financial sector in 2008 and 2009. It made major public announcements about 
extensive future job losses in the civil service. These job reduction targets were 
sufficiently ambitious and opaque to reduce the confidence of almost any civil servant 
in their continued employment in the public sector. The results should have been 
anticipated. 
It has been popular to brand European governments (and in some cases whole 
societies) that are pushing up on their sovereign debt limits as being profligate while, 
in reality, their deficits would have been manageable if there had been the expected 
return to economic growth. It seems clear that, just as in the 1930s when the effects of 
the stock market crash of 1929 on the real economy were poorly understood and 
underestimated, the effects of the financial crisis that started in 2007 were largely 
unanticipated and underestimated. It was assumed that ensuring sufficient liquidity 
combined with a moderate degree of government stimulus would be sufficient to 
return developed countries to sustained, if moderate, growth. The forecasts of 
economic activity in developed countries for 2010 and 2011 put out by major 
institutions such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have had to be consistently 
revised downward. Projections for the best of the major developed economies at the William A. Kerr 
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beginning of 2012 are for modest growth at best. Many countries in Europe are 
expected to achieve no growth, and a few are expected to experience recessions. None 
has sufficient projected growth to provide the number of jobs to reduce politically 
unacceptable levels of unemployment and the increased tax revenues to alleviate 
difficulties in managing government debt levels. It appears as though the adjustments 
required in the wake of the financial crisis have simply been too large for many 
governments to manage. The limits of the Keynesian fix may have been reached. 
There is no clear way to easily return to sustained economic growth. Governments 
have pulled all the domestic economic levers available, low interest rates and 
stimulus, with little sustained effect other than rising deficits and debt. Certainly, a 
1930s style depression has been avoided but neither is there rapid sustained growth. 
Governments are very constrained, threading a fine line with only the ability, at best, 
to stabilize demand while struggling to remain fiscally responsible. These narrow 
policy constraints do not provide politically convenient options for policy makers.  
The real lesson is that booms that are allowed to turn into bubbles will burst, and 
the consequences may be beyond governments’ ability to manage successfully. Thus, 
there needs to be more proactive management of booms. Of course, successfully 
limiting the excesses of a boom has always proved very difficult because no one 
wants to be the one to spoil the party. There is, however, considerable regulatory 
reform currently underway that will hopefully prevent a repeat of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis. While this work is undoubtedly required, it is a bit like closing the 
barn door after the horses have escaped. Unfortunately, the source of bubbles tends to 
shift – from tulip bulbs to south sea enthusiasms to common stocks to sub-prime 
mortgages and the illusion of fully diversified risk. 
International Cooperation and Recessions 
hile it is easy to criticise those policy makers who failed to prevent the 
financial collapse, the real question is what will happen now that developed-
country governments are faced with the potential of a long period of poor economic 
performance and, in particular, high and sustained levels of unemployment. If, as 
appears likely, developed-country governments have exhausted all of the domestic 
policy levers that can normally be used to stimulate economic growth, then one 
obvious avenue would be to seek solutions in the external policy realm. There are two 
major external policy avenues that have the potential to provide an impetus for 
economic growth. These are imposition of trade barriers and strategic devaluation of 
the exchange rate. The first attempts to stimulate domestic employment by forcing the 
substitution of domestically produced goods and services for those of foreign origin. 
W William A. Kerr 
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This is classic protectionism. The second is to grow the export sector through 
devaluation. The employment export growth provides by making domestically 
produced goods and services cheaper for foreign customers to buy has the added 
benefit that at the same time it makes foreign goods more expensive, thereby forcing 
the same substitution to consuming domestically produced products as is the case 
through the erection of trade barriers. In both cases, altering trade flows provide the 
stimulus for growth. Hence, devaluation may appear a politically convenient policy 
option. 
Of course, both protectionism and devaluation are naïve because, to have the 
desired effect, they require that trade partners take no action in response. The use of 
strategic devaluations and the erection of trade barriers, of course, negatively impact 
trading partners; these strategies are, in effect, attempts to shift domestic economic 
pain onto foreigners – which is also part of the reason they can appear convenient for 
politicians. If foreign governments retaliate by imposing trade barriers or engaging in 
their own strategic devaluation, this can lead to non-cooperative beggar thy neighbour 
rounds of disruptive re-retaliation. This was the experience of the 1930s. It was a hard 
lesson learned by the policy makers of the time. 
When they set about to establish a new post-war international order as the Second 
World War drew to its close, those same policy makers understood the need to 
encourage cooperative solutions to international conflicts rather than destructive, non-
cooperative solutions. The mechanism they chose to accomplish this objective was the 
establishment of formal international organizations to seek cooperative solutions to 
what they perceived as the four sources of international conflict: (1) political 
impasses; (2) differences in living standards; (3) the imposition of trade barriers and; 
(4) strategic devaluations (Kerr, 2010a). Prior to the Second World War there had been 
a formal international organization to address only one of these four sources of 
conflict – political conflict. This was the League of Nations established in the wake of 
the First World War. The League did, however, establish committees to work toward 
cooperative solutions to the economic sources of international conflict (Pauly, 1996). 
The failed World Monetary and Economic Conference held in London in June 1933 
just prior to Keynes’ observations in the Daily Mail that began this article was one 
such League of Nations–sponsored attempt at a cooperative solution. 
To replace the failed League of Nations to deal with political conflict, a new (and 
improved) United Nations was established. To deal with differences in levels of 
economic  capability the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development – or, 
as it is more commonly called, the World Bank – was established as a result of 
negotiations held at Bretton Woods in July 1944. To deal with the imposition of trade William A. Kerr 
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barriers, an International Trade Organization (ITO) was negotiated in Havana in 1947-
48 (Kerr, 2010b). Although the ITO never came into being because the agreement to 
establish it would not have been approved by the U.S. Congress, one of its sub-
agreements, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) became the de facto 
international institution to deal cooperatively with potential conflicts over barriers to 
international trade. The final organization, to deal with potential conflicts over 
strategic devaluations, was the International Monetary Fund (IMF); again a result of 
the negotiations at Bretton Woods. 
These multilateral organizations have proved to be robust, durable and adaptable. 
Although they have not been able to eliminate non-cooperative solutions in situations 
of conflict, there is little doubt that they have reduced their impact. For example, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which arose out of the GATT Uruguay Round 
(1986-1994) negotiations, appears to have been sufficiently influential to prevent 
politicians from embarking on a spate of tariff increases
3 in the 2008 recession, as 
their predecessors had done in the 1930s (Viju and Kerr, 2011). In part, this reflects 
the political will expressed in the joint statements coming out of G-8 and G-20 
meetings, whereby politicians cooperatively eschew the raising of trade barriers; in 
part, it is due to the transaction costs imposed by the institutional commitments 
associated with the WTO (Viju and Kerr, forthcoming). In any case, the lessons of the 
1930s regarding beggar thy neighbour trade wars have not been forgotten and the 
institutional arrangements put in place after the Great Depression’s non-cooperative 
era have worked as they were intended. 
With the imposition of trade barriers effectively closed off as a convenient policy 
to provide an engine for domestic economic growth, this leaves strategic devaluation. 
It is clear neither that the lessons of the 1930s are current among political decision 
makers nor that the multilateral institution is sufficiently robust to deter attempts to 
engage in strategic devaluations in 2012 and beyond. Of course, a strategic 
devaluation is likely to lead to retaliatory devaluations and a descent into the 
downward spiral of beggar thy neighbour devaluations. This was well understood by 
those attempting to shape a new world order for the post–Great Depression era. In a 
speech to a meeting of European Allies on February 26, 1943, Keynes suggested: 
We should like to have some agreed system to prevent competitive 
exchange depreciations. Exchanges have to be altered from time to time 
because the social and wage policies of different countries do not keep step 
with one another necessarily but there should be no exchange 
depreciations which are merely passing on one country’s perplexities to 
neighbours. Some provision should be made against that.
4 William A. Kerr 
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The eventual organization established to deal with the concern expressed about 
strategic devaluations by Keynes (and many others) was the IMF. It was, however, 
designed for an era of fixed exchange rates. While the IMF survives, thinking on 
international economics has evolved, with the current norm being floating exchange 
rates – although seldom freely floating exchange rates, as governments often intervene 
to alter exchange rates to varying degrees. Some countries such as China intervene 
heavily on a continuous basis while many other countries have a much lighter touch. 
Having said that, the use of strategic devaluations by developed countries has seldom 
occurred in the last three decades. The IMF has had sufficient resources to support 
individual developing and transition economies’ currencies if governments are willing 
to implement the reforms the institution requires as a condition of its assistance. The 
IMF, however, does not have sufficient resources to support the currency of a major 
developing country. Hence, in response to the recession following the financial crisis 
that commenced in 2007, the IMF has received a substantial increase in its resources, 
but it is generally agreed that these are still not sufficient for the institution to deal 
with a major crisis on its own. 
The United States, because of its position as the issuer of the international reserve 
currency, is a special case. As a result, much of the focus has been on countries that 
use the euro as their currency. A number of euro using countries are portrayed as 
having no policy options because they are unable to devalue. In reality, they are no 
different from individual states or provinces in federal states (Reeves and Kerr, 1985). 
The finances of states such as California have been at least as shambolic as those of 
Greece or Portugal for decades, although for different reasons. No one suggests that 
California should abandon the dollar as its currency and issue califlorins that they 
could then strategically devaluate to spur growth. Greece could default on its debt 
without having to leave the euro – and in fact the 50 percent haircut on privately held 
Greek debt agreed at the summit on October 27, 2011 (The Economist, 2011) 
represents exactly such a default. It was, of course, pre-agreed and orderly. Certainly, 
a unilateral default by a member of the Eurozone would weaken the confidence of the 
international investor community in the capacity of individual countries to manage 
their debts, but in and of itself it would not lead to the abandonment of the currency. 
Federal states have to deal with a wide range of economic stresses while keeping a 
common currency (Reeves and Kerr, 1986). Thus, when German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and French President Nicholas Sarkozy bluntly told Greek Prime Minister 
Papandreou prior to the G-20 summit on November 3, 2011 that the referendum on 
the bailout package he had proposed would have to be a simple vote on Greece William A. Kerr 
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continuing to use the euro, they were using the threat of the chaos that leaving the 
euro would mean for Greece as leverage to have the proposed vote cancelled. 
Behind the crisis management of the sovereign debt problems lurks the possibility 
of a number of countries leaving the euro so that strategic devaluations could be 
attempted. EU member states that retain their own currencies may also be considering 
the strategic devaluation option – primarily to foster economic growth. Devaluation is 
not, however, a magic bullet that can solve a country’s economic problems. While it 
helps exports, it also raises the costs of imported inputs used by exporting firms – so 
the net effect may be much smaller than expected. Consumers face higher prices for 
imported products and, hence, are poorer in just the same way as they would be after a 
rise in domestic taxes. Debts denominated in the national currency held by foreigners 
decrease in value and, hence, are a de facto partial default, and can be expected to 
have the same effect on investors’ confidence. Thus, while increased exports and 
import substitution are expected to lead growth, the actual boost to the domestic 
economy may be considerably muted. Devaluations lead to considerable turmoil for 
firms as relative prices take time to adjust, making contract setting and investment 
decisions more difficult and more risky.  
The political convenience of strategic devaluation is premised on the naïve 
assumption that trading partners won’t retaliate. While some modest adjustments in 
the exchange rate, such as a decline of sterling against the euro, could take place 
without retaliation, relative movements sufficient to stimulate significant economic 
growth would surely trigger retaliation. Small economies might successfully engage in 
strategic devaluations because their impact on the economies of major currencies 
might be sufficiently limited to be ignored. Success by one small country, however, 
would likely spur copycats whose cumulative economic effect could not be ignored. 
Further, small economies may compete directly in markets such as tourism. As a 
result, any advantage gained could be negated by other small-country competitors 
retaliating. Beggar thy neighbour rounds of strategic devaluations lead to constant 
price disequilibrium, which raises the level of risk for businesses. This increase in risk 
will inhibit investment, which can have detrimental long-run effects. Strategic 
devaluation is not likely to prove to be as politically convenient as some decision 
makers may assume. 
Conclusion 
he major long-term problem arising from the fallout from the financial crisis that 
started in 2007 is that the developed countries have failed in their attempts to 
return their economies to paths of sustained growth. Beyond reducing unemployment,  TWilliam A. Kerr 
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growth is required to increase tax revenues so that the need to finance government 
expenditures through borrowing is reduced. Some developed-country governments, 
however, have reached the limits of their ability to borrow to finance government 
deficits, forcing a movement to pro-cyclical fiscal policies such as expenditure 
reductions and/or tax increases. In most cases their central bank interest rates are near 
or at their lower limit. As a result, governments have exhausted the domestic policy 
levers they have available to stimulate growth and are considering external trade and 
currency policies as alternatives. 
In the case of trade restrictions, the lessons of the 1930s appear to have retained 
their currency with policy makers. In the case of strategic devaluation, the restraining 
force of history may not have as much efficacy. Strategic devaluation may appear as a 
convenient policy avenue to escape negative or near zero growth. Strategic 
devaluation will only be a successful policy if other countries take no notice. Policies 
that act in the international sphere, however, impose costs on foreign economies, 
eliciting retaliation – a non-cooperative response. The lesson of the 1930s is that the 
non-cooperative outcome is likely to be inferior to the cooperative outcome, although 
policy makers in that era did not express the results in that way. Their activities after 
the Great Depression, however, were all aimed at ensuring that non-cooperative 
solutions were not again embraced by economic policy makers for reasons of political 
convenience.       William A. Kerr 
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Endnotes 
                                                      
1.  Reprinted in Keynes and Moggridge (1982), p. 250. 
2.  Prosperity is just around the corner was the famous slogan of U.S. President 
Herbert Hoover in the early 1930s. 
3.  Or the imposition of other trade barriers. 
4.  Reprinted in Keynes and Moggridge (1980), p. 208. 